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ARTICLE
REVISITING COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS: THE
EVIDENCE FROM EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE
Dan Qu
School of Economics and Trade, Hunan University, China
Abstract
This paper uses 1996 and 2001 Survey of Income and Program
Participation to examine the evidence for compensating wage differentials
associated with employer-provided health insurance (EHI) in the United
States. The results provide no evidence of a tradeoff between wages and
EHI coverage. On the other hand, the results do suggest that employees
who work in states with income taxes are more likely to receive EHI than
those in states without income taxes. Fixed effects, first differencing and
instrumental variable estimation are used to address the potential ability
bias and endogeneity problems in wage models with EHI as an independent
variable. While both fixed effects and first-differencing estimation provide
evidence of a positive relationship between wages and EHI, validity tests
cast doubt on fixed effects estimation. Instrumental variable estimates,
however, provide no evidence of a tradeoff in either direction.
Key Words: Compensating Wage Differentials, Employer-Provided Health Insurance, First
Differencing Estimation, Fixed Effects Estimation, Instrumental Variable Test
JEL No I13, I14, I15, J3,
Introduction
Employer-provided health insurance (EHI) is the primary type of insurance for most
of the Americans. At least two thirds of Americans under 65 years of age have health
insurance at their workplaces. Regardless of that, a continuous decline of the percentage of
population with EHI was observed in the past decade. For instance, it was reported that the
percentage of the population under 65 years of age covered by EHI decreased from 66.7% in
2000 to 65% in 2002; reaching at 61% in 2006.1
Declines in EHI coverage and the number of insured do not change the fact that EHI
is still accepted by most employees in the United States which is mainly due to the advantage
of tax deductibility. Employees benefit extensively from buying health insurance through
workplaces.
Building on the situation aforesaid, this study explores the question that whether
employees who obtained EHI earn a lower wage compared to those who lost EHI. The labor
market outcome of having or losing EHI may have significant implications for health
insurance reforms.

1.

Information about of EHI is also introduced in the report on health in the United States, issued by
the National Center for Health Statistics (2007).
5
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This study is based on the theory of compensating wage differentials. The pertinent
theory was first suggested in the work of “The Wealth of Nations” (Smith, 1776). In a
competitive labor market, an employer provides both pecuniary and non-pecuniary wages to
workers. The non-pecuniary wage includes many aspects of a job; such as environment,
location, how dangerous the work is, and all forms of benefits (vacation, pension, health
insurance, etc.). Assuming that employees are all alike and that all jobs are identical,
compensation packages for employees will locate on the same downward sloping budget
constraint line. As a result, an employee who chooses a job offering higher health insurance
coverage does so at the expense of giving up a certain amount of pecuniary wage. That is to
say, the employer will pass at least a part of the cost of providing health insurance onto the
employee in the form of a lower wage. An employee’s willingness to give up some pecuniary
wage and accept better health insurance critically depends on how much she values this health
insurance. If the employee attaches higher value to EHI than to the amount of money she
gives up, the cost may be passed wholly onto the employee. If the employee has other sources
of health insurance, such as obtaining health insurance through his spouse, she may value the
health insurance less; thus, the employer may bear some costs for providing the health
insurance.
This study aims to contribute to the existing literature by empirically examining
compensating wage differentials associated with EHI using the data from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). First, SIPP is a nationally representative,
longitudinal survey that provides extensive information on labor market behavior and health
insurance status. Specifically, it not only collects information on whether the respondent has
EHI, but also on the amount the employer pays for the health insurance and whether the
employee obtains the health insurance through his/her dependent’s or through her own
employer.2 Second, this paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of available
empirical methodologies employed in studying compensating wage differentials.
This paper includes the following sections: the next section highlights literature
review, section III sets up the empirical specification, section IV shows the discussion of data,
while section V propounds empirical results. Section VI concludes the paper.
Empirical Evidences from Previous Studies
Most empirical studies previously carried out on compensating wage differentials
associated with health insurance find that results are either insignificant or contradictory to
the theory (Leibowitz, 1983; Woodberry, 1983; Eberts and Stone, 1985; Monhiet et al., 1985;
Gruber and Krueger, 1990; Royalty, 2000; Jensen and Morriesty, 2001; Baiker and Chandra,
2005). A common explanation for the contradiction is the omission of worker’s personal
ability. OLS estimation is criticized by researchers for failing to capture workers’ unobserved
characteristics. However, the evidence to support the theory from fixed effects and two-stage
least squares (2SLS) estimation is also fairly limited.

2.

SIPP asks respondents “Did ...'s employer/union pay all, part, or none of the premium of the
plan?”
6
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There are two critical problems generally found in previous studies. One is the data
problem. Some studies use aggregated data (Woodbury, 1983; Gruber and Krueger, 1990;
Gruber, 1994; Royalty, 2000), which tends to omit individual specific characteristics. The
other problem is the application of OLS estimation. It has been discussed extensively that
OLS estimation cannot capture all of a worker’s unobserved characteristics (Brown, 1980,
Duncan and Holmlund, 1983, Jensen and Morriesy, 2001, Simon, 2001; Miller, 2004, Olson,
2002, Baiker and Chandra, 2005). As an addition, this study uses a national longitudinal data
set – SIPP to exploit individual level information in estimating the differential, and compares
fixed effects estimates to the first-differencing and instrumental variable estimates.
Empirical Specification
The empirical estimation model is based on a human capital earnings model
augmented with measurement of an employee’s health insurance coverage.
(1)

Wit = f ( X it , EHI it , u it )

where W is the hourly wage rate for worker i at time t, X is a set of individual characteristics
that determines one’s wage, EHI is a vector of the worker’s health insurance coverage, and u
is a stochastic error term. The wage equation used in this study is log linear.
(2)

log(Wit ) = X it β + EHI it γ + α i + u it ,

where i indicates an individual. The problem in estimating equation 2 is that we may not
observe all X′s. Some of the individual characteristics are observable (such as race, gender,
age, etc.) and some are not (such as worker’s intelligence, ability, etc.). The unobserved timeconstant worker specific characteristic (such as α i ) can bias the OLS estimation of γ in 1
due to a possible correlation between these omitted variables and the worker’s fringe benefits.
As a result,

COV ( EHI it , u it ) ≠ 0 . An employee with higher ability typically earns a

higher wage and receives better health insurance given that all workers’ other characteristics
are alike. Therefore, if the unobserved characteristics are positively correlated with the wage
level, γ will be less negative and even positive. However, it is almost impossible to precisely
measure these unobserved characteristics. This is a problem that cross-sectional data and OLS
estimation encounter and cannot solve.
One solution to the problem is to apply fixed effects estimation. The fixed effects
estimation takes away these unobserved and time-constant characteristics by including a
dummy variable and captures variation within each individual. Thus, by taking into
consideration the covariance between health insurance coverage and unobserved variables,
we can eliminate the bias in estimation.
On the basis of this consideration, the first-differencing method is also proposed in
this study. The first-differencing method also eliminates the worker’s unobserved
characteristics. Compared to the fixed effects estimation, this method captures the changes in
the log hourly wage and health insurance coverage from one period to the next. It estimates
7
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whether the hourly wage increases when an employee gains EHI. A negative coefficient of
the change in health insurance coverage indicates that getting better health insurance benefit
lowers the hourly wage. Therefore, compared to demeaning explanatory variables in the fixed
effects estimation, the first-differencing estimation assumes faster adjustment of the wage to
changes in EHI. In this case, the first-differencing estimation could be more appropriate than
the fixed effects estimation.
Besides the fixed effects and the first-differencing estimation, an instrumental
variable (IV) test is also applied in this study to solve the endogeneity problem. Valid
instruments are required to be uncorrelated with the error term (unobserved personal
characteristics), but be correlated with endogenous variable (an employee’s EHI status). In
order to see the compensating wage differentials for working wives, instruments in this study
include husband’s EHI status, education level, union status and firm sizes.
Data
This study uses 1996 and 2001 SIPP panel data and includes employees who work at
private firms that are for profit and whose ages are between 25 and 65. 3 The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the hourly wage at the current main job. This study uses
information on the primary job. In order to protect the respondent’s confidentiality, publicly
used data on hourly wages and monthly wages in SIPP are top-coded, which follows a
complex procedure.4 This study applies the mean above the top-code to top-coded values. The
mean above the top-code is estimated by the lognormal distribution provided by Boushey
(2006).5 Then hourly wage rate can be calculated.6 Hourly wages that are less than $1 are
excluded in this study.
EHI is a dummy variable, which equals “1” if covered by employer-provided health
insurance and “0” otherwise. Personal information includes gender, race, marital status, age,
3.

4.

5.

SIPP is a set of longitudinal survey data first collected in 1984 by the US Census of
Bureau. Each panel of the survey is randomly divided into four groups. Each group is
interviewed in a separate month. The same group is interviewed every four month,
which is called a wave. Information in SIPP falls in two categories: core and topical.
Core data includes information collected in every interview, and less frequently asked
questions are collected in topical modules.
Hourly wages are top-coded at $30 dollars, and monthly wages are top-coded at $12,500
per month or 50,000 for four months. Any wage that is greater than the “acceptable
threshold” will be assigned a value either equal to the threshold or coded in terms of the
respondent’s gender, race etc.
In “SIPP user notes”, Boushey (2006) lists means above top-codes for both monthly
wage and hourly wage. Two results are estimated by lognormal and Pareto distributions
and one is calculated by the formula provided by the US Census Bureau. The mean
provided by the US Census is much higher than the other two. This study chooses the
mean estimated by lognormal distribution.


6.

S



Hourly wage rate is calculated by  4.2 H  , where S is the monthly wage rate and H is
total hours worked per week.
8
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and years of education. SIPP provides information on the highest grade employees attended. I
apply the second reconciling strategy on educational-attainment questions introduced by
Jaeger (1997) and recode these variables into how many years of education each employee
attained. It ranges from 0 (didn’t go to school at all) to 20 years (professional and Ph.D).
Labor market consequence variables include information on industry, occupation
and firm sizes, part-time or full- time working schedule, and union membership. Individual’s
industry and occupation are coded in accordance with CPS system. Both include 14
categories. Full time workers are defined as those who work 35 hours or more per week7.
Dummy variable “CHAGE” is “1” if the employee has ever changed jobs since last and “0”
otherwise.
This study also includes year and state dummy variables. Seven year-dummy
variables8 capture the general changes in wages due to inflation and any specific shocks in a
certain year. State dummies help to pick up differences in the cost of living across states.
More importantly, generosity of compensation may be differently correlated with the wage
level across states. An interaction term between EHI and union status is included to test the
effect of unionization on compensating wage differentials for EHI. The second interaction
term between married and EHI included is to test whether married couples may tradeoff
wages and EHI differently. The third interaction term is between “JBCHANGE” and EHI to
examine whether an employee who has ever changed the job and gained EHI may
compensated with a lower wage level.
Besides the estimation of wage equation, this study also examines factors that may
affect the probability that an individual employee obtains EHI at the workplace. In particular,
the impact of state income taxes is examined. An income tax t is a dummy variable with “1”
referring to states with income tax and “0” without income tax. A linear probability test is
conducted in which the dependent variable EHI with “1” referring to having EHI and “0”
otherwise.
V. Results
OLS, Fixed Effects and First-differencing estimation.
In table 2, EHI is significantly and positively correlated with wages, but the
magnitude is smaller in first-differencing estimation. In first-differencing estimation,
independent variables are changes of variables from the last period. The dependent variable is
the change of an employee’s log hourly wage. A significant positive estimate of EHI indicates
that gaining EHI increases the growth rate of one’s hourly wage by 2.4%. Changing the jobs
lowers the growth rate of one’s wage. The growth rate of wages for elder workers is higher
than that for younger workers, but age has a decreasing marginal effect on the growth rate of
wages.
7.
8.

Refer to CPS and American Time Use Survey.
Year dummy variables include years from 1996 to 1999, and from 2001 to 2003. This is
an unbalanced panel data. The 2001 survey didn’t finish all interviews that are supposed
to be 12 waves, due to a funding problem.
9
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Table 2. Estimation of log hourly wage (comparison of OLS and FE and FD)
IV

OLS
(1)

FE
(2)

FD
(3)

EHI

.207***
(.006)

.068***
(.009)

.024**
(.010)

Union member

.131***
(.003)

.016***
(.006)

.003
(.006)

Firm with 25-99 employees

.013**
(.007)
.071***
(.005)
--

-.007
(.009)
.005
(.008)
--

.205***
(.002)
-.029***
(.006)
.040***
(.005)

--

-.021*
(.012)
-.007
(.011)
-.154***
(.006)
--

--

--

--

--

.048***
(.0008)

.113***
(.005)

.018**
(.007)

-.0005***
(9.46e-06)

-.0008***
(.00006)

-.0002***
(.00008)

Married

.069***
(.002)

.017**
(.006)

.010
(.008)

Education

.058***
(.0005)

--

--

Intercept

.201***
(.028)

-.745***
(.132)

.020**
(.0008)

No. of obs
Standard errors in parentheses

210360

210360

152904

Firm with 100+ employees
changed jobs
Male
African American
White
Age
Age square

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This study follows the test of strict exogeneity in an expanded equation proposed by
Wooldridge (2002) to test the validity of the two estimations. The results show that the firstdifferencing estimation is more appropriate than the fixed effects estimation.
Compensating Wage Differentials by Age and Gender Groups
With the knowledge that first-differencing estimation is more appropriate, table 3
and table 4 present first-differencing estimates by age and gender. The results in table 3
indicate that among middle-aged employees (age 35 ~ 54), there is a positive correlation
10
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between wage and health insurance. The estimates for younger employees and elder
employees show no correlation between wages and health insurance benefits. The age
differences between group (1) and (2) (t = 2.18) and group (1) and (3) (t = 2.22) are both
significant. Therefore, compared to younger employers (age 25 ~ 34), middle-aged employees
are more likely to gain both higher wages and better health insurance benefits. Age
differences between group (2) and (4) (t =1.13) and (3) and (4) (t =1.25) are insignificant at
5% level.
Table 3. First-differencing estimation by age group
Dependent variable = ∆ log (hourly wage)
25-34
(1)

35-44
(2)

45-54
(3)

55-65
(4)

∆ EHI

.026
(.018)

.031*
(.019)

.037*
(.022)

-.001
(.021)

∆ union

.017
(.012)

.007
(.009)

-.004
(.010)

-.016
(.016)

∆ firm with 25-99
employees

-.028
(.023)

-.040**
(.020)

.005
(.021)

-.014
(.033)

∆ firm with 100+
employees

-.005
(.020)

-.030
(.019)

-.004
(.020)

.034
(.029)

-.157***
(.011)

-.157***
(.012)

-.168***
(.014)

-.126***
(.017)

∆ married

.016
(.012)

-.022
(.015)

.055***
(.020)

-.031
(.049)

∆ Age

-.012
(.037)

.037
(.039)

-.033
(.055)

-.146
(.090)

∆ Age square

.0002
(.0006)

-.0005
(.0005)

.0004
(.0006)

.001
(.0008)

-.128***
(.011)

-.138***
(.012)

-.151
(.014)

-.115
(.017)

40907

50957

41508

19532

IV

Changing jobs

Intercept
No. of obs
Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results in table 4 indicate that a male employee tends to obtain both a higher
wage and better health insurance. There is no correlation between wages and health insurance
for a female employee (column 2). However, the gender difference is insignificant (t=.030).
11
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Table 4. First-difference estimation by gender

IV

∆ EHI
∆ union
∆ firm with 25-99 employees
∆ firm with 100+ employees
changing jobs

∆ Age
∆ Age square
∆ married
Intercept
No. of obs
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Dependent variable = ∆ log (hourly wage)
Male
Female
(1)
(2)
.027*
.021
(.014)
(.014)
.001
.005
(.007)
(.009)
-.024
-.021
(.016)
(.018)
-.009
-.005
(.014)
(.016)
-.165
-.140***
(.009)
(.009)
.020**
.014
(.010)
(.011)
-.0002*
-.0002*
(.0001)
(.0001)
.0005
.022
(.011)
(.012)
.018***
.023***
(.001)
(.001)
90274
62630

First-difference Estimation with Interaction Terms.
In order to identify possible factors that might contribute to a positive correlation
between wages and EHI coverage, three interaction terms are included. Using firstdifferencing estimation, these effects are examined. The results in table 5 indicate that
changing jobs contribute to a positive correlation between hourly wage rise and EHI
coverage.
Table 5. First-difference estimation with interaction terms
Variables
EHI

∆ Union membership * ∆ EHI

(1)
.024**
(.010)
-.090
(.057)

changing jobs* ∆ EHI

(3)
.024**
(.010)

.072**
(.032)

∆ Married* ∆ EHI
No. of obs.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(2)
.015
(.010)

.065
(.088)

(4)
.015
(.010)
-.090
(.056)
.072**
(.032)
.065
(.085)

152904

12
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The Impact of Income Taxes on the Probability of Receiving EHI.
Table 6 presents results of the probability that an employee obtains EHI. The
empirical results (column 1) show that an employee who lives in a state with income taxes is
10% more likely to have EHI. Union membership, being married, working in a larger firm
and working longer hours increase the probability of having EHI. The likelihood of having
EHI increases as age increases, but eventually decreases with increasing age. Female
employees are more likely to have EHI than male employees. This may be because of a
greater demand for EHI by women; as they tend to make more use of the health care system
at younger ages. The results also show that higher education is associated with a lower
likelihood of having EHI. This may be because more educated employees pay more attention
to the cost of health insurance than less educated ones, and so are less likely to sacrifice pay
for EHI. In any case, this is a surprising result; education increases wages which is generally
associated with a higher probability of having EHI.
In column 2, an interaction term between gender and the education level is added to
the regression to indentify any differences between female and more educated employees and
others. The result indicates that female and more educated workers do not behave differently
from others in having EHI. Column 3, 4 and 5 test the probabilities of obtaining EHI of
married employees, husbands and wives. Results match well with those using the whole
sample in column 1.
IV Estimation.
Instrumental variable estimation is also a method used to alleviate omitted variable
problems. Column 1 and 2 in table 8 used the same instruments that Olson used in his study.
The results show that the EHI has no influence on wages, which is different from the results
in Olsen’s study. Before conducting other IV estimation, the weak instruments test and
erogeneity test (in table 7) showed that that instrumental variables should include HEHI,
HUNION, HSIZE, and HEDU. Column 6 and 7 suggest that instruments are not weak and the
over-identification test does not reject the null hypothesis. When including SPEDU (column
8), exogeneity test suggests that SPEDU is an invalid instrument.
IV estimation of the whole sample and full-time working wives are presented in
table 8. Following the discussion in Olson’s paper (2002), the spouse′s education level is
included in the wage equation. Columns 3 to 5 use the sample of full-time working wives
with three different sets of instruments. Columns 6 to 8 use the sample of all employees.
Estimates for the two samples are very similar. When using the spouse’s education as the only
instrument, there is a positive correlation between the wage level and EHI coverage. When
using the other two sets of instruments, estimates are insignificant. Therefore, there is no
evidence of a connection between the wage level and EHI coverage.
First differenced IV and fixed effects IV estimation are also applied for full-time
working wives. Estimates of EHI in both fixed effects IV and first differenced IV are negative
but insignificant, especially in first differenced IV estimation the coefficient is even more
negative.
13
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Conclusions
This study uses SIPP data to test compensating wage differentials associated with
employer-provided health insurance. To solve the omitted variable problem, fixed effects
estimation, first-differencing estimation, IV estimation, first differenced IV estimation, and
fixed effects IV estimation methods are employed. Results of fixed effects and first-difference
estimation lead to the conclusion that employees tend to receive higher wages when they gain
EHI. A validity test of the two indicates that the first-differencing estimation is more
appropriate than the fixed effects estimation. IV estimation, fixed effects IV estimation and
first differenced estimation suggest that EHI has no influence on wages.
This study suggests that employees who live in states that collect income taxes are
more likely to have EHI than those who live in states without income taxes. This could be
because of the tax advantage from having EHI. Changing jobs contributes to a positive
correlation between having EHI and the wage growth.
In the future study of compensating wage differentials, to uncover the correlation
between wage and EHI coverage, it may be interesting to consider the following three
aspects. First, it would be useful to consider information on employers’ preferences of
providing benefit packages. It is possible that an employer would prefer to provide a higher
wage premium and better health insurance benefit in order to avoid worker’s shirking.
Second, it would be useful to apply continuous data for EHI coverage rather than the dummy
indicator. Third, the tax rate information could also indicate the level and progressivity of the
state tax system.
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APPENDIX
Literature on compensating wage differentials in health insurance
Author

Data

Method

Compensating wage differentials for work characteristics
Brown (1980) 1966-71 and 1973 NLS Fixed effects
Young men’s sample estimation
(470 observations)

Duncan and
Holmlund(19
83)

Self-report survey of a
sample of Swedish men
in 1968 and 1974

Fixed effects
estimation

Compensating wage differentials for fringe benefits
Leibowitz
1978 RAND Health OLS
(1983)
Insurance Study, fulltime
workers (136
observations)
Woodbery
1966-74 BLS survey Estimation of
(1983)
and a sample of indirect utility
independent
school function
that
districts from the 1977 involves
the
Census of Governments elasticity
of
substitutability
of wage and
fringe benefits
Eberts
and 1972-73 and 1976-77 Fixed effects
Stone (1985)
full-time
elementary estimation

Result
Positive but insignificant
correlation between wage
and job characteristics. No
significant improvement,
compared
to
level
estimation.
Compared to Brown’s
results, their results (of
correlation between wage
and job characteristics) are
improved, although some
results
are
still
insignificant.
Positive and insignificant
correlation between health
insurance and wages
Wage and fringe benefits
are
substitutes.
The
elasticity
of
the
substitutability is greater
than 1.

Negative and significant
correlation between health
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Monhiet et al.
(1985)

Gruber
Krueger
(1990)

and

and
secondary
classroom teachers in
N.Y.
1977 NMCES, full-time
workers

January – June 2015
benefits and wages
OLS estimation
by occupation

1979-81 and 1987-88
CPS data, and 1979-88
state-level
employer
reported data from BLS
CPS, states that passed
state
maternity
mandates after 1974
and federal mandates
after 1978 and states
that didn’t
Matching the wage data
from 1990 and 1991
March CPS with the
health care cost data
obtained from Milliman
and Robertson survey.
RWJ-EHIS (1993-94)
aggregated to firm-level

OLS,
first
differencing

Jensen
and
Morriesy
(2001)

1994 and 1998 Health
and Retirement Survey

IV estimation

Simon (2001)

1984-2000 even year
DWS data

Fixed effects
estimation

Olson (2002)

March-June
1990-93
CPS
for
full-time
working wives

IV estimation

Miller (2004)

1988-90 CEX

Fixed effects
estimation

Baiker
and
Chandra
(2005)

Kaiser
Foundation

Gruber
(1994)

Sheiner
(1999)

Royalty
(2000)

Family

Positive correlation in most
occupations, professional
and technical workers
showed
negative
but
insignificant correlation.
Insignificant results by
OLS estimation except for
truck drivers,

Differences-indifferences-indifferences

Negative and significant
correlation between wage
and
mandated
health
insurance
for
20-40
married women.

OLS

Older worker suffers larger
decrease in wage than
young worker, result is
significant
for
male
workers, but insignificant
for female
Negative and insignificant
correlation between wages
and health insurance
Correlation between wage
and health insurance and
pension are negative and
insignificant.
Displaced worker who find
a new job gains wage when
having EHI, and loses
wage when losing EHI
Full-time working wives
will accept jobs with health
insurance when wages
decrease by 20%.
Negative and significant
between the change in
wages and the change in
health insurance status
Negative but insignificant
correlation between wages
and health insurance

Logit
estimation

IV estimation

20

Published by iRepository, April 2021

